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In 2009, Thailand experienced rapid spread of the 
pandemic inﬂ   uenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus. The national 
response came under intense public scrutiny as the number 
of conﬁ   rmed cases and associated deaths increased. 
Thus, during July–December 2009, the Ministry of Public 
Health and the World Health Organization jointly reviewed 
the response efforts. The review found that the actions 
taken were largely appropriate and proportionate to need. 
However, areas needing improvement were surveillance, 
laboratory capacity, hospital infection control and surge 
capacity, coordination and monitoring of guidelines for 
clinical management and nonpharmaceutical interventions, 
risk communications, and addressing vulnerabilities of non-
Thai displaced and migrant populations. The experience in 
Thailand may be applicable to other countries and settings, 
and the lessons learned may help strengthen responses 
to other pandemics or comparable prolonged public health 
emergencies.
C
ases of inﬂ   uenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus were ﬁ  rst 
reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) 
by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) on April 24, 2009 (1). On April 27, the director 
general of WHO raised the level of the inﬂ  uenza pandemic 
phase from 3 to 4, and 2 days later, the level was raised 
to 5 (2). In Thailand, because of experience gained during 
the response to an outbreak of avian inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) 
(3,4), the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) immediately 
assumed a central role in coordinating national response 
efforts to a possible inﬂ  uenza A(H1N1)pdm09 outbreak in 
that country.
On May 12, 2009, 2 imported cases of A(H1N1)
pdm09 virus infection were detected in Thailand, and by 
the end of the month, 12 more cases were reported by the 
MOPH. In early June, indigenous outbreaks associated 
with entertainment centers (5), schools (6), and military 
barracks (7) were reported. By July, A(H1N1)pdm09 virus 
transmission was detected in all 76 Thai provinces, and 65 
deaths were conﬁ  rmed to be associated with the infection.
National surveillance data indicated that 2 pandemic 
waves occurred during the initial 12-month outbreak 
period. The ﬁ   rst wave began in May 2009, peaked in 
July, and subsided in December; the second wave began 
in January 2010, peaked in early February, and subsided 
in April. A third pandemic wave occurred during the 
latter part of 2010. During 2009–2010, a total of 234,050 
inﬂ  uenza cases were reported in Thailand. Of these, 47,433 
were laboratory-conﬁ   rmed to be A(H1N1)pdm09 virus 
infections; 347 deaths were associated with the conﬁ  rmed 
cases (Figure 1).
WHO recommends that countries review their 
pandemic response and mitigation efforts immediately 
after a pandemic peak or pandemic phase. In mid-July 
2009, the MOPH proposed that the Thai national response 
be reviewed. This proposal was partially in response to 
publicly voiced criticism that the pandemic response 
had not been appropriately handled. To demonstrate 
transparency and to garner insight from countries that could 
share valuable insight from their pandemic experience (e.g., 
Australia and Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China), 
the Thai MOPH review team was joined by WHO staff 
and external technical specialists. Seven focus areas were 
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identiﬁ  ed for review: 1) surveillance and epidemiology; 
2) laboratory services; 3) public health interventions and 
control measures (including hospital infection control); 
4) clinical management; 5) logistics, commodities, and 
operations; 6) public communications; and 7) measures 
to assist vulnerable non-Thai populations. The reviews 
were conducted during August 18–December 6, 2009. In 
total, 47 team members participated and contributed 271 
person-days. Detailed reports and a 28-page summary of 
the strengths and challenges of the Thai pandemic response 
were submitted to the minister of health.
The formal review ﬁ  ndings (lessons learned) as well as 
those from a review of the local experience in Thailand are 
being used to inform current and future pandemic plans in 
Thailand. They are also likely applicable to other countries 
and settings and could be used to strengthen responses to 
future pandemics or to comparable severe, prolonged public 
health emergencies. In this article, we outline some of the 
lessons learned during the ﬁ  rst 12 months of the national 
response to the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic in Thailand.
Lessons Learned in Thailand
Layered Surveillance Is Critical to an Effective 
Pandemic Response
During the SARS outbreak, the screening of inbound 
passengers for fever at national/international ports of 
entry was a common practice by most countries. Thus, 
politicians and the public believed that the strategy should 
be included as part of any global epidemic response effort. 
During the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic, this belief created 
an environment in which it became difﬁ  cult for the Thai 
MOPH to target screening activities toward identifying and 
testing only symptomatic persons arriving from affected 
countries. At the same time, the MOPH recognized that 
screening for A(H1N1)pdm09 infection was different 
than screening for SARS. They realized that SARS-like 
screening might be of limited value because persons 
with asymptomatic A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection 
could transmit the virus, and persons with symptomatic 
infection might not have symptoms during inbound border 
screening. For this reason, fever screening at ports of entry 
was adopted, not with the expectation of containing early 
local spread but with the less ambitious aim of possibly 
detecting infections earlier and slowing the initial spread of 
virus, thus providing more time to prepare for the pandemic 
(8,9). Screening of inbound air passengers to Thailand was 
implemented on April 27, 2009. Persons with suspected 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection were treated with antiviral 
drugs, and close contacts of possible case-patients were 
given prophylaxis. By June 17, a total of 1,669,501 
inbound passengers had been screened at Thailand’s main 
international airport in Bangkok; 638 of those screened had 
a fever, and only 2 were conﬁ  rmed to have A(H1N1)pdm09 
virus infection. As the pandemic spread rapidly throughout 
Thailand, the value of inbound screening was increasingly 
questioned, and screening was eventually stopped at the 
end of September 2009.
As expected, despite active screening of inbound 
air passengers, indigenous transmission and outbreaks 
were soon observed in entertainment venues and schools. 
Thailand’s routine national surveillance system includes 
a national passive notiﬁ   able disease surveillance system, 
which includes notiﬁ   cation of pneumonia and inﬂ  uenza 
cases requiring hospitalization (deﬁ   ned mainly by code 
criteria of the International Classiﬁ  cation of Diseases, Tenth 
Revision). Thailand’s national inﬂ  uenza surveillance also 
includes a sentinel system focused on monitoring virus 
infections; the system includes 8–10 sentinel hospitals that 
obtain data and specimens from patients seeking medical 
care for inﬂ  uenza-like illness (ILI). In response to the 2009 
pandemic, the MOPH enhanced the surveillance system in 
2 ways. First, in May 2009, the MOPH established a daily 
ILI reporting system to measure geographic and temporal 
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Figure 1. Reported number of inﬂ  uenza 
cases, laboratory-conﬁ  rmed inﬂ  uenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infections, and 
deaths associated with conﬁ  rmed 
inﬂ  uenza  A(H1N1)pdm09  virus 
infections, Thailand, 2009–2010. ILI, 
inﬂ   uenza-like illness; OP, outpatient; 
IP, inpatient.SYNOPSIS
trends for ILI in hospital outpatient departments across 
the country. Second, the network of sentinel inﬂ  uenza 
surveillance sites previously established to monitor inﬂ  uenza 
serotypes was supplemented by an additional 14 new 
sites. Sites in the expanded network collected respiratory 
specimens and performed inﬂ  uenza testing for outpatients 
with ILI and for hospitalized patients with pneumonia. These 
additions enabled monitoring of spatial-temporal trends and 
estimations of the prevalence of disease. Overall trends 
for ILI mirrored those of laboratory-conﬁ   rmed cases of 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection, supporting the usefulness 
of ILI data (online Technical Appendix, wwwnc.cdc.gov/
EID/pdfs/11-0976-Techapp.pdf).
In addition to these noted strengths in Thailand’s 
national surveillance system response, the review team 
also identiﬁ  ed several areas in which improvements should 
be pursued. These included improving linkages between 
epidemiologic, laboratory, and clinical data sources; 
expanding private health care participation in surveillance 
activities; and strengthening capacity for infectious disease 
modeling.
Development of Guidance for Clinical Management 
and Antiviral Drug Use Is an Iterative Process
Before onset of the pandemic, the Thailand MOPH 
had established a national stockpile of 300,000 oseltamivir 
treatment courses, which was sufﬁ  cient to treat 0.5% of the 
population. An additional 1 million courses were added 
when reported cases and deaths appeared to accelerate 
during the ﬁ  rst pandemic wave. The decision to increase 
the stockpile was prompted in part by the results of local 
mathematical modeling exercises, which suggested that 
among the Thai population of 63 million persons, 157,000 
could be hospitalized with A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection 
and 1,260 could die.
The process of supplying oseltamivir to health facilities 
was greatly facilitated by a central, Internet-based vendor-
managed inventory system, which enabled daily updating 
of hospital inventories. Individual health care facilities 
were primarily responsible for monitoring and replenishing 
their stocks of personal protective equipment, which were 
supplemented by a network of regional and provincial 
stockpiles.
A clinical case management and practice guideline 
was rapidly made available to all health care workers; the 
guideline was updated on 3 occasions as new information 
became available. Revisions focused on the medical 
management of patients at risk for severe disease, including 
the need for early administration of oseltamivir (Figure 
2). However, anecdotal reports suggested that nationwide 
adoption of new guidelines by physicians may take up 
to a month, indicating a need for innovative methods to 
introduce and implement new guidelines.
An initial policy of screening and testing all persons 
at risk for A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection proved pro-
blematic. The policy was instituted in an attempt to mitigate 
spread of infection; however, it led to a widespread public 
perception that laboratory testing was mandatory for 
diagnosis and treatment of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection. 
The MOPH subsequently rescinded the policy and issued 
guidance recommending that persons with suspected 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection be treated on the basis of 
clinical rather than laboratory ﬁ  ndings. However, patients 
overlooked the revised policy and continued to request 
laboratory conﬁ  rmation of infection, and physicians felt 
obliged to respond to patient requests; thus, laboratory 
services became overburdened.
Laboratory Services Can Become Overburdened
The laboratory system in Thailand provided 
commendable support to national efforts for combatting 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus transmission, especially during the 
early months of the pandemic. Vast numbers of specimens 
were tested, and laboratories operated 24 hours a day, 
7 days a week. In most cases, laboratory reports were 
provided within 24 hours of specimen receipt. Laboratory 
support and expansion were well articulated in Thailand’s 
national inﬂ  uenza preparedness plan, and surge capacity 
was quickly organized and implemented.
During the pandemic, the use of PCR was adopted 
as a standard for laboratory diagnosis of inﬂ  uenza. PCR 
technology had already been used at the National Inﬂ  uenza 
Center and 3 university teaching hospitals in Bangkok, 
and capacity was rapidly established in an additional 14 
regional laboratories to share the burden of work and enable 
rapid testing. The increased capacity for laboratory testing 
enabled the National Inﬂ   uenza Center and 1 university 
laboratory to focus on more specialized testing, including 
molecular sequencing and monitoring of antiviral drug 
resistance.
In addition to these strengths in the national response 
effort, the review team also identiﬁ  ed several weak areas in 
need of improvement. The need to strengthen laboratories 
was highlighted in the national preparedness plan and 
implemented at the start of the pandemic; however, as 
discussed above, a national strategy for rational use of 
laboratory services during high-demand situations was 
not available to clinicians and public health professionals 
early in the pandemic. This lack of guidance resulted in 
an extremely heavy demand for laboratory services. 
Furthermore, although a plan was in place, it did not 
anticipate the number of specimens for which testing was 
requested. During the ﬁ  rst 3 months of the pandemic, the 
National Inﬂ  uenza Center in Thailand processed 10,796 
specimens, of which 4,082 were positive for A(H1N1)
pdm09 virus infection. Although additional surge capacity 
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was soon developed and implemented, the heavy demands 
for laboratory testing led to delays in making some results 
available. Recommendations for future strengthening of 
the laboratory system included expanding PCR capacity in 
provincial hospitals, which could serve as referral centers, 
and clarifying roles speciﬁ  ed for each type of laboratory. 
Such actions would help optimize the laboratory system, 
maximize efﬁ   ciency, and enable central laboratories to 
focus on more specialized functions and research activities.
Enhanced Infection Control and Surge Capacity 
Is Needed for Intensive Care Services
During the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic in Thailand, 
several outbreaks were reported among hospital staff and 
patients (10). Infection prevention and control practices 
appeared to vary at the health care facility level, although 
most hospitals had dedicated infection control nurses and 
functional infection prevention and control committees. 
Before the pandemic, excellent arrangements were in place 
for screening and triage in hospitals. The arrangements were 
derived from procedures established during the outbreak 
of inﬂ   uenza virus A(H5N1), However, despite those 
arrangements, outpatient services during the ﬁ  rst pandemic 
wave were soon overwhelmed with “worried well” 
persons seeking information and advice. Hospitals became 
crowded with patients with ILI, among whom only a small 
proportion had moderate to severe inﬂ  uenza. Intensive care 
units in many hospitals became overburdened during the 
peak of the ﬁ  rst wave. Optimal delivery of care might have 
been achieved through better networking among hospital 
intensive care units; improved networking could have 
enabled the sharing of caseloads, resources, and expertise.
Application and Monitoring of Nonpharmaceutical 
Interventions Must Be Consistent
The use of good hand hygiene practices, social 
distancing measures, and face masks was emphasized in 
national policy and prevention guidelines. These measures 
were widely promoted and implemented, particularly during 
the ﬁ  rst pandemic wave, when awareness and anxiety levels 
were high. Implementation of social distancing measures 
varied by setting, especially in relation to school closure; 
the varied implementation was probably due in part to 
the decentralization of decision-making to the local level. 
The business sector, health foundations, schools, and local 
community authorities provided good support for public 
education campaigns. An initial shortage of alcohol gel and 
face masks was addressed by increasing local production.
An effective mechanism for oversight was not established 
at the outset of the pandemic, and the lack of such a mechanism 
presented a challenge for monitoring the effectiveness of 
public health interventions. Variation and “drift” in the 
application and implementation of national policies and 
guidelines were also observed at different administrative 
levels. Local variations in compliance with national policies 
and guidelines may have been related to differences in the 
perception of risk among health professionals and the public 
and to ineffective communication and feedback systems 
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Figure 2. Third edition (July 17, 2009) of 
clinical practice guidelines for treatment 
of patients with suspected inﬂ  uenza 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection in 
Thailand. The guidelines were prepared 
by the Clinical Management Taskforce, 
Thailand Ministry of Public Health, and 
experts from medical schools. The 
guidelines are subject to modiﬁ  cation 
according to the pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
situation; updates are made available 
at www.moph.go.th. CXR, chest x-ray; 
COPD, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease; SLE, systemic lupus 
erythematosus; DM, diabetes mellitus; 
bid, twice a day; CAPD, continuous 
ambulatory peritoneal dialysis; RR, 
respiratory rate; SpO2, saturation of 
peripheral oxygen.SYNOPSIS
between authorities at the central level and health providers 
at peripheral levels. One recommendation for addressing 
this challenge in the future is to establish a national public 
health emergency incident command center to coordinate 
and communicate policies, strategies, and guidance related 
to an emergency and to monitor their execution and facilitate 
feedback to concerned parties, particularly on problems 
related to implementation.
Availability and Uptake of Pandemic
Vaccine Must Be Timely
In July 2009, the Thai government approved the 
procurement of 2 million doses of A(H1N1)pdm09 vaccine. 
This amount was determined by using existing registries 
and other data to estimate the number of health care workers 
and the number of persons considered to be at high risk for 
complications related to A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection. 
The vaccine arrived at the end of the ﬁ  rst wave, during the 
last week of December 2009, and was targeted to groups at 
high risk and to frontline health care workers. Vaccination 
campaigns began in early January 2010, but vaccination 
uptake was slow and less than projected. There are several 
possible reasons for this, including the perception of 
diminishing risk and safety concerns expressed by members 
of the public, in part related to media reports of (unrelated) 
fetal deaths in pregnant women who had received the 
vaccine. Uptake among pregnant women was only 6% 
(30,000) of the planned 500,000 target population. This 
percentage is consistent with observations by obstetricians 
that pregnant women in Thailand were not convinced that 
the potential beneﬁ  ts of vaccination greatly outweighed 
any possible risk.
At the same time that Thailand is trying to improve 
access to pandemic inﬂ  uenza vaccine, it is also trying to 
establish national capacity for pandemic vaccine production. 
Since 2008, and with the support of WHO’s Global Action 
Plan, the Thailand MOPH has embarked on a development 
project to enhance national capacity for pandemic inﬂ  uenza 
vaccine development and production. This country project 
aims to establish capacity for producing inactivated and 
live-attenuated pandemic vaccines. Although this project 
did not produce a vaccine in time for the 2009 A(H1N1)
pdm09 pandemic, it has served as an excellent platform for 
further development of the national and regional inﬂ  uenza 
vaccine capacity in preparation for future pandemics.
Risk Communication Requires Active 
Coordination and Monitoring
Public information and risk communication messages 
were disseminated through a variety of media, including 
television, radio, and extensively distributed printed 
materials. However, on several occasions, government 
ofﬁ  cials issued contradictory statements on the status of 
the pandemic or conﬂ   icting health advice. A possible 
explanation for these shortcomings was the lack of a 
systematic process to ensure timely delivery of consistent 
and correct information to the public by politicians, 
ofﬁ  cials, and partners. The communications infrastructure 
in Thailand is strong; however, some partners could 
have been better used to assist with disseminating 
public communications and with collecting feedback 
regarding the effectiveness of key messages in terms 
of public understanding and behavior. Furthermore, it 
would seem intuitive that better communication and 
public messaging could be used to address the challenges 
previously discussed in terms of vaccine uptake and 
health system overloads caused by the worried well. One 
recommendation proposed addressing these weaknesses 
by establishing an operational risk communications unit 
within MOPH.
Needs of Displaced Persons/Migrants 
Must Be Included in Pandemic Preparedness 
and Response Plans
An estimated 144,567 displaced persons live in 9 
temporary shelters in Thailand, predominantly on the 
Thailand/Myanmar border, and ≈2 million registered and 
unregistered international migrants provide unskilled labor 
in Thailand. Displaced persons residing in temporary 
shelters receive basic health care services primarily from 
nongovernmental organizations, and a compulsory migrant 
health insurance scheme is in place for registered migrants 
in Thailand.
Surveillance for inﬂ  uenza and other priority communi-
cable diseases is considered to function well and is linked 
with the national surveillance mechanisms. However, 
pandemic response plans for different displaced and migrant 
population settings were not always congruent, and speciﬁ  c 
national policies were not completely explicit in deﬁ  ning 
access to services (care and laboratory diagnostics) and life-
saving medicines, such as oseltamivir. In many such settings, 
surge capacity for delivery of health care was limited, and 
staff and volunteer health workers were not sufﬁ  ciently 
trained in pandemic inﬂ  uenza preparedness and response. 
Also, public health messages were sometimes not available in 
the language of displaced or migrant persons (11). However, 
among displaced and migrant populations during the ﬁ  rst 
12 months of the pandemic, only 1 documented A(H1N1)
pdm09 outbreak occurred, with no conﬁ  rmed deaths, and the 
review team found that, in general, services were provided 
on a humanitarian basis when needed.
External Evaluation of Response Efforts 
after a Pandemic Peak Is Useful
The team reviewing Thailand’s pandemic response 
identiﬁ  ed numerous strengths and several shortcomings. 
1062  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 18, No. 7, July 2012Lessons Learned from Inﬂ  uenza Pandemic Response
Because of the timing of the review, some of the lessons 
learned and some of the shortcomings, particularly in 
the areas of health care surge capacity, surveillance, and 
laboratory capacity, were at least partially addressed or 
rectiﬁ  ed during the second and third waves of the A(H1N1)
pdm09 pandemic. In addition, the review ﬁ  ndings  and 
lessons learned are now being used to guide development of 
future pandemic preparedness plans in Thailand. The joint 
MOPH/WHO pandemic review required the mobilization 
of substantial human and ﬁ  nancial resources at a time of 
already considerable demand. Therefore, consideration 
should be given to building a strong monitoring and 
evaluation component into pandemic preparedness plans, 
including surge capacity for handling review tasks.
Discussion
We describe lessons learned from the national response 
to the inﬂ  uenza A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic in Thailand by 
reviewing the local experience and a formal MOPH/WHO 
report on a joint review of the response efforts (12). Several 
of the lessons learned have been identiﬁ  ed and discussed in 
other reports; our work supports and enriches the published 
data surrounding these lessons.
A report of the WHO Review Committee on the 
functioning of the international health regulations in 
relation to the A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic (13) stressed 
that the response requirements of health care systems 
needed more attention and strengthening. The report also 
advocated interim case-ﬁ  nding, treatment and management 
protocols and algorithms, infection control guidelines, 
guidance on triaging and surge capacity management, and 
stafﬁ  ng strategies. The ﬁ  ndings in the WHO report, much 
like our ﬁ  ndings, emphasized that although avian inﬂ  uenza 
had made a difference in pandemic preparedness for Asian 
countries, the 2009 inﬂ  uenza pandemic strained health care 
and laboratory services, and the strain would have been 
worse in a more severe pandemic.
Fisher et al., in a review of pandemic response lessons 
from 6 Asian countries (Singapore, Hong Kong, People’s 
Republic of China, Malaysia, South Korea, and Vietnam) 
(14), noted some key health challenges similar to those 
in the Thailand experience: a need to strengthen health 
care surge capacity (especially intensive care services), 
an inability of containment measures to prevent cross-
border entry of inﬂ  uenza, challenges with the adoption of 
recommendations for empiric use of oseltamivir, and the 
insufﬁ  cient coordination of the dissemination of clinical 
management and laboratory protocols and updates and 
other communications. In addition, Hanvoravongchai et al. 
and the AsiaFluCap Project (15) reported results from rapid 
analyses of pandemic inﬂ  uenza preparedness in 6 Asian 
countries. Similar to the situation in Thailand, many of the 
countries were challenged by the need for greater ﬂ  exibility 
in pandemic planning and implementation in order to 
accommodate changing transmission circumstances and 
different pandemic scenarios.
The importance of a joint review after a pandemic peak 
or pandemic phase cannot be overemphasized. In Thailand, 
the review process and reports, which clearly identiﬁ  ed 
strengths and weaknesses of the pandemic response and 
provided concrete suggestions for how lessons learned 
might be used to revise plans for dealing with future 
events, were used to modify the national response during 
the second and third waves of the 2009 inﬂ  uenza pandemic. 
In addition, lessons learned from the review are serving as 
a helpful resource for the development of a new 5-year 
national strategic plan for preparedness and response to 
emerging diseases, which will be submitted for ofﬁ  cial 
government endorsement in the near future.
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